, Volume 40, Issue 2, pp 379–393 | Cite as

On Ignorance: A Vindication of the Standard View



Rik Peels has once again forcefully argued that ignorance is not equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge. In doing so, he endeavors to refute the Standard View of Ignorance according to which they are equivalent, and to advance what he calls the “New View” according to which ignorance is equivalent (merely) to the lack or absence of true belief. I defend the Standard View against his new attempted refutation.


Ignorance Belief Knowledge Propositions Facts Truth 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, Religion, and Classical StudiesThe College of New JerseyEwingUSA

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