, Volume 39, Issue 2, pp 327–334 | Cite as

Genuine Counterexamples to the Simple Conditional Analysis of Disposition: A Reply to Choi

  • Jaeho Lee


Choi (Philosophia, 38(3), 2010) argues that my counterexamples in Lee (Philosophia, 38(3), 2010) to the simple conditional analysis of disposition ascription are “bogus” counterexamples. In this paper, I argue that Choi’s arguments are not satisfactory and that my examples are genuine counterexamples.


Disposition Conditional analysis Sungho Choi Jaeho Lee 



I would like to thank Andrew McAninch and the anonymous reviewer for helpful comments.


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  4. Gundersen, L. B. (2002). In defense of the conditional account of dispositions. Synthese, 130, 407.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Lee, J. (2010). Disposition, explanation, and causation—a defense of the reformed conditional analysis of disposition. Philosophia, 38(3).Google Scholar
  6. Salmon, W. C. (1989). Four decades of scientific explanation. In P. Kitcher & W. C. Salmon (Eds.), Scientific explanation (pp. 300–301). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyIndiana UniversityBloomingtonUSA

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