Philosophia

, Volume 39, Issue 2, pp 289–296 | Cite as

Phenomenal Continuity and the Bridge Problem

Article

Abstract

Any theory that analyses personal identity in terms of phenomenal continuity needs to deal with the ordinary interruptions of our consciousness that it is commonly thought that a person can survive. This is the bridge problem. The present paper offers a novel solution to the bridge problem based on the proposal that dreamless sleep need not interrupt phenomenal continuity. On this solution one can both hold that phenomenal continuity is necessary for personal identity and that persons can survive dreamless sleep.

Keywords

Phenomenal continuity Temporal gaps The bridge problem Personal identity Barry Dainton Psychological continuity 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Division of PhilosophyRoyal Institute of TechnologyStockholmSweden

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