, Volume 39, Issue 1, pp 179–200 | Cite as

Moral Responsibility Invariantism



Moral responsibility invariantism is the view that there is a single set of conditions for being morally responsible for an action (or omission or consequence of an act or omission) that applies in all cases. I defend this view against some recent arguments by Joshua Knobe and John Doris.


Moral responsibility Doris Knobe Experimental philosophy 



I am grateful to audiences at UCLA and Florida State University and to Michael McKenna, Randy Clarke, Stephen White, and Lewis Powell for their comments on previous drafts.


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of ArizonaTucsonUSA

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