, Volume 38, Issue 3, pp 533–554 | Cite as

The Individual Variability Problem

  • Dimitria Electra GatziaEmail author


Studies show that there are widespread intrasubjective and intersubjective color variations among normal perceivers. These variations have serious ramifications in the debate about the nature and ontology of color. It is typical to think of the debate about color as a dispute between objectivists and subjectivists. Objectivists hold that colors are perceiver-independent physical properties of objects while subjectivists hold that they are either projections onto external objects or dispositions objects have to look colored. I argue that individual color variations present difficulties, albeit not the same kind, for both objectivism and subjectivism. Lastly, I propose an alternative account that handles such variations nicely.


Subjectivism Objectivism Color Individual variations Intersubjective variations Dispositionalism Projectivism Relationalism Pluralism Color fictionalism High-level statistical constructs Individual variability problem 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The University of Akron, Wayne College, Philosophy DepartmentAkronUSA

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