, Volume 38, Issue 2, pp 229–241 | Cite as

McTaggart’s Paradox and Crisp’s Presentism

  • L. Nathan OaklanderEmail author


In his review of The Ontology of Time, Thomas Crisp (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2005a) argues that Oaklander's version of McTaggart's paradox does not make any trouble for his version of presentism. The aim of this paper is to refute that claim by demonstrating that Crisp's version of presentism does indeed succumb to a version of McTaggart's argument. I shall proceed as follows. In Part I I shall explain Crisp's view and then argue in Part II that his analysis of temporal becoming, temporal properties and temporal relations is inadequate. Finally, in Part III, I shall demonstrate that his presentist ontology of time is susceptible to the paradox he so assiduously sought to avoid.


McTaggart Presentism Time Ersatz B-relations Temporal becoming 



I wish to thank V. Alan White and Joshua Mozersky for the very helpful discussions I had with them, and two anonymous referees for their constructive comments.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Michigan-FlintFlintUSA

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