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Philosophia

, Volume 38, Issue 2, pp 399–404 | Cite as

A New Argument for Evidentialism?

  • Masahiro YamadaEmail author
Article

Abstract

In his “A new argument for evidentialism” (Shah, Philos Q 56(225): 481–498, 2006), Nishi Shah argues that the best explanation of a feature of deliberation whether to believe that p which he calls transparency entails that only evidence can be reason to believe that p. I show that his argument fails because a crucial lemma that his argument appeals to cannot be supported without assuming evidentialism to be true in the first place.

Keywords

Epistemology Evidentialism Doxastic deliberation Constitutivism Norm of belief 

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentClaremont Graduate UniversityClaremontUSA

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