Philosophia

, Volume 37, Issue 1, pp 105–107 | Cite as

Still Epiphenomenal Qualia: Response to Muller

Article
First Online:
Received:
Accepted:

Abstract

Hans Muller has recently attempted to show that Frank Jackson cannot assert the existence of qualia without thereby falsifying himself on the matter of such mental states being epiphenomenal with respect to the physical world. I argue that Muller misunderstands the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism and that, as a result, his arguments against Jackson do not go through.

Keywords

Franks Jackson Qualia Epiphenomenalism Higher-order thought 
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

References

  1. Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. The Philosophical Quarterly, 32(127), 127–136. doi: 10.2307/2960077.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Muller, H. (2008). Why qualia are not epiphenomenal. Ratio, 21(1), 85–90.Google Scholar
  3. Rosenthal, D. M. (1986). Two concepts of consciousness. Philosophical Studies, 49(3), 329–359. doi: 10.1007/BF00355521.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.BirkbeckUniversity of LondonLondonEngland

Personalised recommendations