Philosophia

, Volume 37, Issue 1, pp 21–30 | Cite as

Agency, Consciousness, and Executive Control

Article
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Abstract

On the Causal Theory of Action (CTA), internal proper parts of an agent such as desires and intentions are causally responsible for actions. CTA has increasingly come under attack for its alleged failure to account for agency. A recent version of this criticism due to François Schroeter proposes that CTA cannot provide an adequate account of either the executive control or the autonomous control involved in full-fledged agency. Schroeter offers as an alternative a revised understanding of the proper role of consciousness in agency. In this paper we criticize Schroeter’s analysis of the type of consciousness involved in executive control and examine the way in which the conscious self allegedly intervenes in action. We argue that Schroeter’s proposal should not be preferred over recent versions of CTA.

Keywords

Agency Intentional action Causal theory of action Consciousness Executive control 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyRochester Institute of TechnologyRochesterUSA
  2. 2.Department of Philosophy and Religious StudiesMarist CollegePoughkeepsieUSA

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