Philosophia

, Volume 34, Issue 2, pp 143–152

Compatibilism and Doxastic Control

Article

Abstract

Sharon Ryan has recently argued that if one has compatibilist intuitions about free action, then one should reject the claim that agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over coming to believe. In this paper I argue that the differences between beliefs and actions make the expectation of direct voluntary control over coming to believe unreasonable. So Ryan's theory of doxastic agency is untenable.

Keywords

doxastic voluntarism belief agency action theory epistemology 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyFranklin and Marshall College LancasterUSA

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