Stagnation proofness in n-agent bargaining problems
Some bargaining solutions may remain unchanged under any extension of a bargaining set which does not affect the utopia point, despite the fact that there is room to improve the utility of at least one agent. We call this phenomenon the stagnation effect. A bargaining solution satisfies stagnation proofness if it does not suffer from the stagnation effect. We show that stagnation proofness is compatible with the restricted version of strong monotonicity (Thomson and Myerson in Int J Game Theory 9(1):37–49, 1980), weak Pareto optimality, and scale invariance. The four axioms together characterize the family of the bargaining solutions generated by strictly-increasing paths ending at the utopia point (SIPUP-solutions).
KeywordsBargaining Pareto optimality Monotonicity Stagnation
JEL ClassificationC78 D74
- Alós-Ferrer C, García-Segarra J, Ginés-Vilar M (2017) Anchoring on Utopia: a generalization of the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution. Economic Theory Bulletin forthcomingGoogle Scholar
- Peters HJH, Tijs SH (1984) Individually monotonic bargaining solutions of \(n\)-person bargaining games. Method Op Res 51:377–384Google Scholar