Journal of Computer Science and Technology

, Volume 29, Issue 5, pp 918–928 | Cite as

Trusted Integrated Circuits: The Problem and Challenges

  • Yong-Qiang LvEmail author
  • Qiang Zhou
  • Yi-Ci Cai
  • Gang Qu
Regular Paper


Hardware security has become more and more important in current information security architecture. Recently collected reports have shown that there may have been considerable hardware attacks prepared for possible military usage from all over the world. Due to the intrinsic difference from software security, hardware security has some special features and challenges. In order to guarantee hardware security, academia has proposed the concept of trusted integrated circuits, which aims at a secure circulation of IC design, manufacture and chip using. This paper reviews the main problems of trusted integrated circuits, and concludes four key domains of the trusted IC, namely the trusted IC design, trusted manufacture, trusted IP protection, and trusted chip authentication. The main challenges in those domains are also analyzed based on the current known techniques. Finally, the main limitations of the current techniques and possible future trends are discussed.


hardware security trusted integrated circuit hardware Trojan IC authentication IP protection 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yong-Qiang Lv
    • 1
    Email author
  • Qiang Zhou
    • 1
    • 2
  • Yi-Ci Cai
    • 1
    • 2
  • Gang Qu
    • 3
  1. 1.Tsinghua National Laboratory for Information Science and Technology, Research Institute of Information TechnologyTsinghua UniversityBeijingChina
  2. 2.Department of Computer Science and TechnologyTsinghua UniversityBeijingChina
  3. 3.Department of Electrical and Computer EngineeringUniversity of MarylandCollege ParkU.S.A.

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