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Security requirement derivation by noun–verb analysis of use–misuse case relationships: a case study using positive train control

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Abstract

Use cases and misuse cases, respectively, state the interactions that an actor can have and a mal-actor be prevented from having with a system. The cases do not specify either the security requirements or the associated attributes that a system must possess to operate in a secure manner. We present an algorithmic, domain-independent approach rooted in verb–noun analysis of use cases and misuse cases to generate system requirements and the associated security attributes. We illustrate the utility of this general five-step method using Positive train control (PTC) (a command and control system used to navigate trains in a railway grid) as a case study. This approach allows the designer to protect against the effect of wireless vulnerabilities on the safety of PTC systems.

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Correspondence to Mark Hartong.

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The views and opinions expressed herein are that of the authors and do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government, the Department of Transportation, or the Federal Railroad Administration, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.

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Hartong, M., Goel , R. & Wijesekera, D. Security requirement derivation by noun–verb analysis of use–misuse case relationships: a case study using positive train control. Innovations Syst Softw Eng 10, 103–122 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11334-013-0227-6

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Keywords

  • Requirements definition
  • Noun–verb analysis
  • Use cases
  • Misuse case
  • System security
  • Positive train control