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Innovations in Systems and Software Engineering

, Volume 7, Issue 4, pp 303–313 | Cite as

Combining UML, ASTD and B for the formal specification of an access control filter

  • J. Milhau
  • A. Idani
  • R. Laleau
  • M. A. Labiadh
  • Y. Ledru
  • M. Frappier
SI : FM & UML

Abstract

Combination of formal and semi-formal methods is more and more required to produce specifications that can be, on the one hand, understood and thus validated by both designers and users and, on the other hand, precise enough to be verified by formal methods. This motivates our aim to use these complementary paradigms in order to deal with security aspects of information systems. This paper presents a methodology to specify access control policies starting with a set of graphical diagrams: UML for the functional model, SecureUML for static access control and ASTD for dynamic access control. These diagrams are then translated into a set of B machines. Finally, we present the formal specification of an access control filter that coordinates the different kinds of access control rules and the specification of functional operations. The goal of such B specifications is to rigorously check the access control policy of an information system taking advantage of tools from the B method.

Keywords

Access control policy SecureUML ASTD 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London Limited 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • J. Milhau
    • 1
    • 2
  • A. Idani
    • 3
  • R. Laleau
    • 2
  • M. A. Labiadh
    • 3
  • Y. Ledru
    • 3
  • M. Frappier
    • 1
  1. 1.GRIL, Département InformatiqueUniversité de SherbrookeSherbrookeCanada
  2. 2.Département Informatique, LACL, IUT Sénart Fontainebleau, Université Paris-EstFontainebleauFrance
  3. 3.Laboratoire d’Informatique de Grenoble UMR 5217, UJF-Grenoble 1/Grenoble-INP/UPMF-Grenoble2/CNRSGrenobleFrance

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