Journal für Betriebswirtschaft

, Volume 56, Issue 1, pp 3–31 | Cite as

Corporate Hedging, Stakeholderinteresse und Shareholder Value

State-of-the-Art-Artikel

Zusammenfassung

Hedging von Unternehmensrisiken (,,Corporate Hedging“) wird in Zeiten von zunehmender Internationalisierung und volatileren Märkten vielfach als eine Grundaufgabe moderner Unternehmenssteuerung angesehen. Dabei wird Hedging meistens aus der Generalprämisse risikoaverser Wirtschaftssubjekte oder einem natürlichen Schutzbedürfnis ungenügend diversifizierter Stakeholder, seltener aus Sicht der Shareholder heraus begründet. Andererseits werden wohldiversifizierte und risikofreudige Shareholder eher gegen Hedging optieren. Der Beitrag problematisiert diesen im Schrifttum wenig beachteten Widerspruch, nimmt eine Klassifizierung verbreiteter Hedgingmodelle vor und geht insbesondere auf deren Eignung zur Erklärung von Hedging im Shareholder Value-Kontext ein. In der Literatur wird ein Hedgingmotiv von Shareholdern verbreitet aus exogenen Friktionen – wie bspw. der Vermeidung von Insolvenzkosten – abgeleitet und dabei auf plausibilistische Risikomaße, wie etwa die Ausfallwahrscheinlichkeit zurückgegriffen. Der Beitrag nimmt hier eine entscheidungstheoretische Identifikation des kontextadäquaten Risikomaßes nach Rothschild und Stiglitz vor und rekapituliert auf dieser Basis die verschiedenen Literaturauffassungen zum Hedging im Shareholder Value-Kontext. Dabei erweisen sich die dort genannten Hedgingfunktionen als wenig tragfähig; nach Einbeziehung der Stakeholderposition kann über Hedging nicht mehr isoliert unter Risikogesichtspunkten, sondern muss im Lichte von Risk-Return-Trade-offs diskutiert werden.

Schlüsselwörter

Corporate Hedging Shareholder Value Stakeholder Risikomaße 

Abstract

Corporate hedging is commonly viewed as a fundamental task in modern corporate management, especially since markets have become increasingly volatile in the past and most firms have started operating internationally. In the literature, hedging is justified by the assumption of risk-averse decision makers or undiversified stakeholders, but mostly not from the point of view of risk-prone shareholders. This gap in the scientific discussion of corporate hedging is analyzed in the article, which provides a classification of hedging models and discusses their ability to explain corporate hedging from the shareholder’s point of view. In particular, the well-known argument of increasing shareholder value by decreasing the value of external stakeholder claims through hedging is discussed analytically. The paper shows that Rothschild and Stiglitz’s mean preserving spread is the only adequate risk measure in the context of shareholder value and hedging, but renders no robust hedging motive. As a result, the predictions from the literature rely on the use of inadequate risk measures and negligence with regard to the incorporation of risk-return trade-offs.

Keywords

Corporate hedging shareholder value stakeholders risk measures 

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© © Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, Austria 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Lehrstuhl für Allgemeine Betriebswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Finanzierung, Banken und RisikomanagementFriedrich-Schiller-Universität JenaJenaDeutschland

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