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Mind & Society

, Volume 16, Issue 1–2, pp 95–112 | Cite as

Understanding coevolution of mind and society: institutions-as-rules and institutions-as-equilibria

  • Shinji TerajiEmail author
Article
  • 160 Downloads

Abstract

Theories of institutions can be classified into two broad approaches: institutions-as-rules and institutions-as-equilibria. According to the first approach, institutions are conceived as rules that guide the actions of individuals engaged in social interactions. On the other hand, the second approach views institutions as behavioral patterns. In order to have a complete picture of institutions, we need to take both approaches into consideration. Individuals construct mental models to produce expectations about institutions, while institutions make individual expectations relatively compatible. The main purpose of this paper is to develop a general framework within which it is possible to analyze coevolution of individual mental models and institutions.

Keywords

Coevolution Institutions Rules Equilibria Mental models 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsYamaguchi UniversityYamaguchiJapan

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