Mind & Society

, Volume 11, Issue 1, pp 27–40 | Cite as

Probabilities, beliefs, and dual processing: the paradigm shift in the psychology of reasoning

Article

Abstract

In recent years, the psychology of reasoning has been undergoing a paradigm shift, with general Bayesian, probabilistic approaches replacing the older, much more restricted binary logic paradigm. At the same time, dual processing theories have been gaining influence. We argue that these developments should be integrated and moreover that such integration is already underway. The new reasoning paradigm should be grounded in dual processing for its algorithmic level of analysis just as it uses Bayesian theory for its computational level of analysis. Moreover, we propose that, within the new paradigm, these levels of analysis reflect on each other. Bayesianism suggests a specific theoretical understanding of dual processing. Just as importantly, the duality in processing carries over to duality in function; although both types of processes compute degrees of belief, they generate different functions.

Keywords

Algorithmic and computational levels of explanation Bayesianism Binary logic Degrees of belief Dual processing New paradigm Probabilities Uncertainty 

References

  1. Adams E (1998) A primer of probability logic. CLSI publications, StanfordGoogle Scholar
  2. Barbey AK, Sloman SA (2007) Base-rate respect: from statistical formats to cognitive structures. Behav Brain Sci 30:287–292Google Scholar
  3. Bonnefon JF (2009) A theory of utility conditionals: paralogical reasoning from decision-theoretic leakage. Psychol Rev 116:888–907CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Braine MDS, O’Brien DP (1991) A theory of if: a lexical entry, reasoning program, and pragmatic principles. Psychol Rev 98:182–203CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Braine MDS, O’Brien DP (eds) (1998) Mental logic. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, MahwahGoogle Scholar
  6. Byrne RMJ, Johnson-Laird PN (2009) ‘If’ and the problems of conditional reasoning. Trends Cogn Sci 13:282–287CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Chater N, Oaksford M (2009) Local and global inferential relations: response to over (2009). Think Reason 15:439–446CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Chomsky N (1965) Aspects of the theory of syntax. MIT Press, Cambridge, MassGoogle Scholar
  9. de Finetti B (1964) Foresight: its logical laws, its subjective sources (original publication, 1937). In: Kyburg HE, Smokier HE (eds) Studies in subjective probability. Wiley, New York, pp 55–118Google Scholar
  10. Douven I, Verbrugge S (2010) The adams family. Cognition 117:302–318CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Edgington D (1995) On conditionals. Mind 104:235–329CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Elqayam S (2009) Models of dependence and independence: a two-dimensional architecture of dual processing. Think Reason 15:377–387CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Elqayam S, Evans JStBT (2011) Subtracting ‘ought’ from ‘is’: descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking. Behav Brain Sci 34:233–248CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Evans JStBT (2007a) Hypothetical thinking: dual processes in reasoning and judgement. Psychology Press, HoveGoogle Scholar
  15. Evans JStBT (2007b) On the resolution of conflict in dual process theories of reasoning. Think Reason 13:321–339CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Evans JStBT (2008) Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition. Annu Rev Psychol 59:255–278CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Evans JStBT (2010a) Dual process theories of deductive reasoning: facts and fallacies. In: Holyoak KJ, Morrison RG (eds) The Oxford handbook of think reasoning (pp. 115–133). Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  18. Evans JStBT (2010b) Thinking twice: two minds in one brain. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  19. Evans JStBT (2012) Questions and challenges for the new psychology of reasoning. Think Reason 18:5–31Google Scholar
  20. Evans JStBT (in press) Reasoning. In: Reisberg D (ed) The Oxford handbook of cognitive psychology. Oxford University Press, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  21. Evans JStBT, Elqayam S (2011) Towards a descriptivist psychology of reasoning and decision making. Behav Brain Sci 34:275–290CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Evans JStBT, Over DE (1996) Rationality and reasoning. Psychology Press, HoveGoogle Scholar
  23. Evans JStBT, Over DE (2004) If. Oxford University Press, OxfordCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Evans JStBT, Barston JL, Pollard P (1983) On the conflict between logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning. Mem Cognition 11:295–306CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Evans JStBT, Handley SH, Over DE (2003) Conditionals and conditional probability. J Exp Psychol Learn 29:321–355CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Evans JStBT, Over DE, Handley SJ (2005) Suppositions, extensionality, and conditionals: a critique of the mental model theory of Johnson-Laird & Byrne (2002). Psychol Rev 112:1040–1052CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Evans JStBT, Handley SJ, Bacon AM (2009) Reasoning under time pressure: a study of causal conditional inference. Exp Psychol 56:77–83CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Fischhoff B, Slovic P, Lichtenstein S (1977) Knowing with certainty: the appropriateness of extreme confidence. J Exp Psychol Hum 3:552–564CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Fugard AJB, Pfeifer N, Mayerhofer B, Kleiter G (2011) How people interpret conditionals: shifts towards the conditional event. J Exp Psychol Learn 37:635–648CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Gauffroy C, Barrouillet P (2009) Heuristic and analytic processes in mental models for conditionals: an integrative developmental theory. Dev Rev 29:249–282CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. Gilio A, Over DE (in press) The psychology of inferring conditionals from disjunctions: a probabilistic study. J Math PsycholGoogle Scholar
  32. Hahn U (2009) Explaining more by drawing on less. Behav Brain Sci 32:90–91CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Johnson-Laird PN (1983) Mental models. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  34. Johnson-Laird PN, Byrne RMJ (1991) Deduction. Erlbaum, Hove & LondonGoogle Scholar
  35. Johnson-Laird PN, Byrne RMJ (2002) Conditionals: a theory of meaning, pragmatics and inference. Psychol Rev 109:646–678CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Johnson-Laird PN, Legrenzi P, Girotto V, Legrenzi MS, Caverni JP (1999) Naïve probability: a mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychol Rev 106:62–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Jones M, Love BC (2011) Bayesian fundamentalism or enlightenment? On the explanatory status and theoretical contributions of Bayesian models of cognition. Behav Brain Sci 34:169–188CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. Kahneman D, Frederick S (2002) Representativeness revisited: attribute substitution in intuitive judgement. In: Gilovich T, Griffin D, Kahneman D (eds) Heuristics and biases: the psychology of intuitive judgement. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 49–81Google Scholar
  39. Kahneman D, Tversky A (1979) Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47:263–291CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  40. Kruglanski AW, Gigerenzer G (2011) Intuitive and deliberate judgments are based on common principles. Psychol Rev 118:97–109CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  41. Kuhn TS (1970) The structure of scientific revolutions, 2nd edn. University of Chicago Press, ChicagoGoogle Scholar
  42. Kuhn TS (2002) The road since structure: philosophical essays, 1970–1993, with an autobiographical interview. University of Chicago Press, ChicagoGoogle Scholar
  43. Manktelow KI, Over DE, Elqayam S (2011).Paradigms shift: Jonathan Evans and the science of reason. In: Manktelow KI, Over DE, Elqayam S (eds) The science of reason: a Festschrift in Honour of Jonathan St.B.T. Evans (pp. xx). Hove, UK: Psychology PressGoogle Scholar
  44. Marr D (1982) Vision: a computational investigation into the human representation and processing of visual information. Freeman, San FranciscoGoogle Scholar
  45. Oaksford M, Chater N (1998) Rationality in an uncertain world. Psychology Press, HoveCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  46. Oaksford M, Chater N (2007) Bayesian rationality: the probabilistic approach to human reasoning. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  47. Oaksford M, Chater N (2009) Précis of bayesian rationality: the probabilistic approach to human reasoning. Behav Brain Sci 32:69–120CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  48. Oaksford M, Chater N (2011a) Dual systems and dual processes but a single function. In: Manktelow KI, Over DE, Elqayam S (eds) The science of reason: a festschrift in honour of Jonathan St.B.T. Evans. Psychology Press, Hove, pp 339–351Google Scholar
  49. Oaksford M, Chater N (2011b) The ‘is-ought fallacy’ fallacy. Behav Brain Sci 34:262–263CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  50. Oberauer K, Wilhelm O (2003) The meaning(s) of conditionals: conditional probabilities, mental models and personal utlities. J Exp Psychol Learn 29:680–693CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  51. Over DE (1993) Deduction and degrees of belief. Behav Brain Sci 16:361–362CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  52. Over DE (2007) Content-independent conditional inference. In: Roberts MJ (ed) Integrating the mind: domain general versus domain specific processes in higher cognition. Psychology Press, Hove, pp 83–104Google Scholar
  53. Over DE (2009) New paradigm psychology of reasoning. Think Reason 15:431–438CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  54. Over DE, Manktelow KI, Hadjichristidis C (2004) Conditions for the acceptance of deontic conditionals. Can J Exp Psychol 58:96–105CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  55. Over DE, Hadjichristidis C, Evans JS, Handley SJ, Sloman SA (2007) The probability of causal conditionals. Cogn Psychol 54:62–97CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  56. Over DE, Evans JST, Elqayam S (2010) Conditionals and non-constructive reasoning. In: Oaksford M, Chater N (eds) Cognition and conditionals: probability and logic in human thinking. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 135–151CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  57. Pfeifer N, Kleiter GD (2010) Uncertain deductive reasoning. In: Manktelow KI, Over DE, Elqayam S (eds) The science of reason: a festschrift in honour of Jonathan St.B.T. Evans. Psychology Press, Hove, pp 145–166Google Scholar
  58. Politzer G, Bonnefon JF (2009) Let us not put the probabilistic cart before the uncertainty bull. Behav Brain Sci 32:100–101CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  59. Politzer G, Over DE, Baratgin J (2010) Betting on conditionals. Think Reason 16:172–197CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  60. Ramsey FP (1990a) General propositions and causality (original publication date 1929). In: Mellor DH (ed) Philosophical papers. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 154–163Google Scholar
  61. Ramsey FP (1990b) Truth and probability (original publication 1926). In: Mellor DH (ed) Philosophical papers. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 52–94Google Scholar
  62. Sloman SA (1996) The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychol Bull 119:3–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  63. Sloman SA, Over DE (2003) Probability judgement from the inside out. In: Over DE (ed) Evolution and the psychology of thinking. Psychology Press, Hove, pp 145–170Google Scholar
  64. Sloman SA, Over D, Slovak L, Stibel JM (2003) Frequency illusions and other fallacies. Organ Behav Hum Dec 91:296–309Google Scholar
  65. Stanovich KE (1999) Who is rational? Studies of individual differences in reasoning. Lawrence Elrbaum Associates, MahwayGoogle Scholar
  66. Stanovich KE (2004) The robot’s rebellion: finding meaning in the age of Darwin. Chicago University Press, ChicagoGoogle Scholar
  67. Stanovich KE (2008) Higher order preference and the master rationality motive. Think Reason 14:111–127CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  68. Stanovich KE (2009) What intelligence tests miss: the psychology of rational thought?. Yale University Press, New HavenGoogle Scholar
  69. Stroud S (2008) Weakness of will. In Zalta EN (ed) Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall 2008 edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/weakness-will (Stanford: Stanford University
  70. Thompson VA (2009) Dual process theories: a metacognitive perspective. In: Evans JStBT, Frankish K (eds) In two minds: dual processes and beyond. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 171–196CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  71. Thompson VA, Prowse Turner JA, Pennycook G (2011) Intuition, reason, and metacognition. Cogn Psychol 63:107–140CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  72. Tversky A, Kahneman D (1983) Extensional vs intuitive reasoning: the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychol Rev 90:293–315CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  73. Wason PC, Evans JStBT (1975) Dual processes in reasoning? Cognition 3:141–154CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Division of Psychology, School of Applied Social Sciences, Faculty of Health and Life SciencesDe Montfort UniversityLeicesterUK
  2. 2.Department of PsychologyDurham UniversityDurhamUK

Personalised recommendations