Mind & Society

, Volume 11, Issue 1, pp 3–13 | Cite as

Defining features versus incidental correlates of Type 1 and Type 2 processing



Many critics of dual-process models have mistaken long lists of descriptive terms in the literature for a full-blown theory of necessarily co-occurring properties. These critiques have distracted attention from the cumulative progress being made in identifying the much smaller set of properties that truly do define Type 1 and Type 2 processing. Our view of the literature is that autonomous processing is the defining feature of Type 1 processing. Even more convincing is the converging evidence that the key feature of Type 2 processing is the ability to sustain the decoupling of secondary representations. The latter is a foundational cognitive requirement for hypothetical thinking.


Dual process theory Cognitive decoupling Autonomy 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Human Development and Applied PsychologyUniversity of TorontoTorontoCanada
  2. 2.Department of PsychologyYork UniversityTorontoCanada

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