Trust, secrecy and accuracy in voting systems: the case for transparency
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If voting systems are to be trusted, they not only need to preserve both secrecy (if requested) and accuracy, but the mechanisms that preserve these features should be transparent, in the sense of being both cognitively understandable and accessible. Electronic voting systems, much as they promise accuracy in counting, and on top of being criticized for their insufficient protection of secrecy, violate the transparency requirement.
KeywordsSocial epistemology Trust Voting Voting systems Electronic voting
Paper prepared under EU grant FP7-ICT-2007-C 213360 Liquid Publication. Thanks to Stefano Zacchiroli for useful comments.
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