Mind & Society

, Volume 6, Issue 1, pp 53–66 | Cite as

The psychology of dynamic probability judgment: order effect, normative theories, and experimental methodology

  • Jean BaratginEmail author
  • Guy Politzer
Symposium Article


The Bayesian model is used in psychology as the reference for the study of dynamic probability judgment. The main limit induced by this model is that it confines the study of revision of degrees of belief to the sole situations of revision in which the universe is static (revising situations). However, it may happen that individuals have to revise their degrees of belief when the message they learn specifies a change of direction in the universe, which is considered as changing with time (updating situations). We analyze the main results of the experimental literature with regard to elementary qualitative properties of these two situations of revision. First, the order effect phenomenon is confronted with the commutative property. Second, an apparent new phenomenon is presented: the redundancy effect that is confronted with the idempotence property. Finally, results obtained in this kind of experimental situations are reinterpreted in the light of pragmatic analysis.


Dynamic probability judgment Bayesian coherence Probability revising Probability updating Linguistic pragmatics Order effect Redundancy effect 



The authors thank Laura Macchi for her comments on a first draft of this paper.


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Copyright information

© Fondazione Rosselli 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculté des Sciences du SportInstitut Jean Nicod & Université de la MéditerranéeMarseille Cedex 09France
  2. 2.Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)Institut Jean NicodParisFrance

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