Advertisement

Atlantic Economic Journal

, 39:203 | Cite as

Financial Services Industry PAC Contributions and Senate Committee Membership

  • Randall W. BennettEmail author
  • Christine Loucks
Article

Abstract

This paper explores the relationship between relevant senate committee membership and campaign contributions from financial services industry political action committees (PACs) from 1998 to 2002. Since this was a period of significant legislative activity affecting the industry, it provides a fruitful time period to investigate the relationship between contributions and committee membership. It is found that membership on the Senate Banking Committee is consistently related to contributions from financial services PACs. Membership on the Senate Finance Committee is related to PAC contributions from some sectors of the industry for some time periods. It is also found that contributions are significantly higher for those senators facing re-election in the particular election cycle. The importance of relevant committee membershipto PAC contributions in the senate is consistent with previous work dealing with the House.

Keywords

Political action committee contributions Financial services industry 

References

  1. Barone, M., & Cohen, R. E. (2002). The almanac of American politics. Washington, D.C: National Journal.Google Scholar
  2. Barone, M., & Ujifusa, G. (various editions). The almanac of American politics. Washington: National JournalGoogle Scholar
  3. Bennett, R. W., & Loucks, C. (1994). Savings and loan and finance industry PAC contributions to incumbent members of the House Banking Committee. Public Choice, 79(1–2), 83–104.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Bennett, R. W., & Loucks, C. (2008). PAC contributions from sectors of the financial services industry, 1998–2002. Atlantic Economic Journal, 36(4), 407–419.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Brunell, T. L. (2005). The relationship between political parties and interest groups: explaining patterns of PAC contributions to candidates for congress. Political Research Quarterly, 58(4), 681–688.Google Scholar
  6. Calcagno, P. T., & Jackson, J. D. (1998). Political action committee spending and Senate roll call voting. Public Choice, 97(4), 569–585.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Cebula, R. J., & Durden, G. C. (2007). Expected benefits from voting and voter turnout in the U. S.: the role of Senate PAC election campaign contributions, 1960–2004. International. Journal of Applied Economics, 4(2), 1–16.Google Scholar
  8. Greene, W. H. (1993). Econometric analysis (2nd ed.). New York: Macmillian Publishing Company.Google Scholar
  9. Grier, K. B., & Munger, M. C. (1991). Committee assignments, constituent preferences, and campaign contributions. Economic Inquiry, 29(1), 24–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Grier, K. B., & Munger, M. C. (1993). Comparing interest group PAC contributions to House and Senate incumbents, 1980–1986. The Journal of Politics, 55(3), 615–643.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Grier, K. B., Munger, M. C., & Torrent, G. M. (1990). Allocation patterns of PAC monies: The U. S. Senate. Public Choice, 67(2), 111–128.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Kroszner, R. S., & Stratmann, T. (1998). Interest group competition and the organization of congress: theory and evidence from financial services’ political action committees. American Economic Review, 88(5), 1163–1187.Google Scholar
  13. Kroszner, R. S., & Stratmann, T. (2005). Corporate campaign contributions, repeat giving, and the rewards to legislator reputation. Journal of Law and Economics, 48(1), 41–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Loucks, C. (1996). Finance industry PAC contributions to U. S. senators, 1983–1988. PublicChoice, 89(3–4), 219–229.Google Scholar
  15. Mixon, F. G., Crocker, C. C., & Black, H. T. (2005). Pivotal power brokers: theory and evidence on political fundraising. Public Choice, 123(3–4), 477–493.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Munger, M. C. (1989). A simple test of the thesis that committee jurisdictions shape corporate PAC contributions. Public Choice, 62(2), 181–186.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Riddel, M. (2003). Candidate eco-labeling and senate campaign contributions. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 45(2), 177–194.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Stratmann, T. (1991). What do campaign contributions buy? Deciphering causal effects of money and votes. Southern Economic Journal, 57(3), 606–620.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Weingast, B. R., & Marshall, W. J. (1988). The industrial organization of congress: or why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets. Journal of Political Economy, 96(1), 132–163.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Weingast, B. R., & Moran, M. J. (1983). Bureaucratic discretion or congressional control? Regulatory policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission. Journal of PoliticalEconomy, 91(5), 765–800.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© International Atlantic Economic Society 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Business AdministrationGonzaga UniversitySpokaneUSA
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsBoise State UniversityBoiseUSA

Personalised recommendations