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Wireless Personal Communications

, Volume 106, Issue 2, pp 321–343 | Cite as

Revisiting the Security of Qian et al.’s Revised Tree-\(\hbox {LSHB}^+\) Protocol

  • Xinyu LiEmail author
  • Jing Xu
  • Zhenfeng Zhang
Article
  • 68 Downloads

Abstract

Due to the limited computation and memory capabilities of the identification tags, RFID systems are susceptible to various attacks. In 2014, a lightweight mutual authentication RFID protocol that supports key update was proposed by Qian et al., and it was claimed to be secure against several known attacks. In this paper, however, we show that their protocol cannot resist key recovery attack, where an adversary, after interacting with the tag several times, can recover the authentication keys of the system in polynomial time with non-negligible probability. Additionally, we also prove that their protocol cannot provide strong backward security or strong forward security: an adversary who has compromised some continuous authentication keys, can successfully recover all the future authentication keys and some of the previous authentication keys, which completely breaks the security of the authentication protocol. We then propose a new protocol which provides key recovery resilience, both strong backward security and strong forward security, and also resistance against various known types of attacks.

Keywords

RFID Security HB family Tree-based Mutual authentication 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the National Key Research and Development Program of China (2017YFB0802500) and National Natural Science Foundation of China (61572485, U1536205).

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory, SKLCS, Institute of SoftwareChinese Academy of SciencesBeijingPeople’s Republic of China

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