Wireless Networks

, Volume 23, Issue 7, pp 2111–2133 | Cite as

SR3: secure resilient reputation-based routing

  • Karine Altisen
  • Stéphane Devismes
  • Raphaël Jamet
  • Pascal Lafourcade
Article
  • 121 Downloads

Abstract

In this paper, we propose SR3 (which means secure resilient reputation-based routing), a secure and resilient algorithm for convergecast routing in wireless sensor networks. SR3 uses lightweight cryptographic primitives to achieve data confidentiality and unforgeability. Security of SR3 has been proven formally using two verification tools: CryptoVerif and Scyther. We made simulations to show the resiliency of SR3 against various scenarios, where we mixed selective forwarding, blackhole, wormhole, and Sybil attacks. We compared our solution to several routing algorithms of the literature. Our results show that the resiliency accomplished by SR3 is drastically better than the one achieved by those protocols, especially when the network is sparse. Moreover, unlike previous solutions, SR3 self-adapts after compromised nodes suddenly change their behavior.

Keywords

Wireless sensor networks Routing Security Resiliency 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Karine Altisen
    • 1
  • Stéphane Devismes
    • 1
  • Raphaël Jamet
    • 1
  • Pascal Lafourcade
    • 2
  1. 1.VERIMAGUniversité de GrenobleSaint-Martin-d’HèresFrance
  2. 2.LIMOSUniversité Clermont AuvergneAubièreFrance

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