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Water Allocation in Transboundary River Basins under Water Scarcity: a Cooperative Bargaining Approach

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Transboundary river basins are one of the main sources of fresh water which are facing water scarcity. When transboundary water is contested not only the allocation outcomes matter but also the allocation process should possess a certain desirable properties such as flexibility and sustainability. Therefore designing a mechanism that possesses these desirable characteristics and allocates the contested water resource is important as well. This article proposed a water allocation framework by combining the bankruptcy theory with asymmetric Nash bargaining solution concept for solving the water sharing problem in transboundary river basins under scarcity. Furthermore, the allocation framework was applied to the Nile river basin and to a hypothetical water scarce transboundary river basin. The results obtained were then compared with the allocation outcomes from classical bankruptcy allocation rules. The results showed that the proposed method can provide insights which could be useful for obtaining water allocation outcomes which are easier to implement and enforce under water scarce conditions.

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This work was supported by <China Social Science Foundation > under grant number < No.13BMZ057 > . The authors would like to express their gratitude for the support. The authors would also like to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions.

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Correspondence to Dagmawi Mulugeta Degefu.

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The research was completed with the financial support from <China Social Science Foundation > under grant number < No.13BMZ057>. There are no other conflict of interests.

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Degefu, D.M., He, W., Yuan, L. et al. Water Allocation in Transboundary River Basins under Water Scarcity: a Cooperative Bargaining Approach. Water Resour Manage 30, 4451–4466 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11269-016-1431-6

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  • Transboundary river basin
  • Asymmetric Nash bargaining
  • Nile river basin
  • Water scarcity