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Charitable Giving as a Luxury Good and the Philanthropic Sphere of Influence

Abstract

Using regression analysis, 41 years of charitable giving and income data was evaluated to determine if charitable giving is a luxury, normal, or inferior good, and to determine the income elasticity for separate nonprofit sectors. Total Giving to the nonprofit subsector as well as most nonprofit sectors (Religion, Education, Human Services, and Environment) is a normal good, while Arts and International giving are likely luxury goods. However, evidence suggests that Health and Public Benefit are likely inferior goods. This research makes three contributions. First, it offers quantitative data as evidence in the supply-side and demand-side debates. Second, owing to income elasticities, researchers propose the Philanthropic Sphere of Influence and postulate that as incomes rise, donors are more likely to give to causes from which they are less likely to personally benefit. Third, by evaluating charitable giving as a whole and then by each subsector, the research demonstrates that each nonprofit subsector responds uniquely to changes in income. Therefore, nonprofit sectors should be evaluated separately.

Résumé

À l’aide d’une analyse régressive, des dons de bienfaisance et données sur le revenu s’échelonnant sur 41 ans ont été évalués pour déterminer si les dons sont des biens de luxe, normaux ou inférieurs et mesurer l’élasticité des revenus dans divers secteurs sans but lucratif. Les dons totaux versés au sous-secteur sans but lucratif, ainsi qu’à la plupart des secteurs de bienfaisance (religion, éducation, services sociaux et environnement) sont des biens normaux, tandis que ceux touchant les secteurs des arts et international constituent des biens de luxe. Des preuves suggèrent cependant que la santé et la poursuite du bien public sont des biens inférieurs. La présente recherche propose trois contributions. Elle offre d’abord des données quantitatives servant de preuves pour le débat entre le parti de l’approvisionnement et celui de la demande. En deuxième lieu, les chercheurs proposent, en aval des élasticités de revenu, le concept de sphère philanthropique d’influence et postulent que, avec la montée des revenus, les donneurs sont plus enclins à faire des dons à des causes dont ils tireront possiblement moins parti. Enfin, en évaluant les dons de bienfaisance dans leur ensemble puis ceux de chaque sous-secteur indépendamment, la recherche démontre que chaque sous-secteur sans but lucratif ne réagit qu’aux changements de revenus. Les secteurs sans but lucratif devraient conséquemment être évalués séparément.

Zusammenfassung

Anhand der Regressionsanalyse wurden Spenden- und Einkommensdaten für einen Zeitraum von 41 Jahren ausgewertet, um zu ermitteln, ob wohltätige Spenden ein Luxus-, normales oder inferiores Gut sind und um die Einkommenselastizität für unterschiedliche gemeinnützige Sektoren festzustellen. Die Gesamtspenden an den gemeinnützigen Teilsektor sowie auch an die meisten gemeinnützigen Sektoren (Religion, Bildung, Humandienstleistungen und Umwelt) sind ein normales Gut, während Spenden im Kunst- und internationalen Bereich wahrscheinlich Luxusgüter darstellen. Hingegen gibt es Nachweise dafür, dass Gesundheit und Gemeinnützigkeit wahrscheinlich inferiore Güter sind. Die Forschungsarbeit leistet drei Beiträge. Erstens bietet sie quantitative Daten als Anhaltspunkt für die Debatte zu Angebot und Nachfrage. Zweitens bringen die Forscher aufgrund von Einkommenselastizitäten den philanthropischen Einflussbereich ein und behaupten, dass bei steigendem Einkommen auch die Wahrscheinlichkeit steigt, dass Spender für Zwecke spenden, von denen sie nicht unbedingt persönlich profitieren. Drittens zeigt die Forschungsarbeit anhand einer Bewertung sowohl der gesamten gemeinnützigen Spenden als auch der Spenden in den jeweiligen Teilsektoren, dass sich Einkommensänderungen auf jeden gemeinnützigen Teilsektor unterschiedlich auswirken. Aus diesem Grund sollten gemeinnützige Sektoren getrennt bewertet werden.

Resumen

Utilizando análisis de regresión, se evaluaron 41 años de datos sobre ingresos y donaciones benéficas para determinar si las donaciones benéficas son un bien de lujo, normal o inferior, y para determinar la elasticidad de los ingresos para sectores de organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro separados. Las donaciones totales al subsector de las organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro, así como también a la mayoría de los sectores de organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro (religión, educación, servicios sociales y medioambiente) es un bien normal, mientras que las donaciones internacionales y a obras de arte son probablemente bienes de lujo. Sin embargo, las pruebas sugieren que la salud y el bien público son probablemente bienes inferiores. La presente investigación hace tres contribuciones. En primer lugar, ofrece datos cuantitativos como prueba en el debate desde el lado de la oferta y desde el lado de la demanda. En segundo lugar, debido a la elasticidad de los ingresos, los investigadores proponen la Esfera Filantrópica de Influencia y postulan que a medida que los ingresos suben, es más probable que los donantes den donativos a causas de las que es menos probable que se beneficien personalmente. En tercer lugar, mediante la evaluación de las donaciones benéficas como un todo y también por cada subsector, la investigación demuestra que cada subsector de organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro responde únicamente a los cambios en los ingresos. Por consiguiente, los sectores de organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro deben ser evaluados de forma separada.

Chinese

本研究使用回归分析对41年慈善捐赠与收入数据进行评估,以确定慈善捐赠是奢侈品(luxury good)、正常品(normal good)还是抵挡品(inferior goods),并确定各不同非营利性部门的收入弹性(income elasticity)。对非营利性次级部门以及大多数非营利性部门(宗教、教育、人文服务与环境)的总捐赠属于正常品。然而,证据显示,卫生与公益很可能是抵挡品。本研究有三方面的贡献。首先,为供给侧与需求侧争论提供了可作为证据的量化数据。其次,由于收入弹性,研究者提出了慈善范围内的影响,并假设:随着收入增加,捐赠者就更愿意为那些他们亲身受益可能性较低的事业提供捐赠。第三,通过对慈善捐赠进行整体评估,再按照次级部门对慈善捐赠进行评估,本研究显示非营利性次级部门对收入变化的反应具有独特性。因此,应当分别对非营利性部门进行评估。

Japanese

回帰分析を用いて、慈善活動の提供が贅沢、普通、粗悪であるかを決定する。独立した非営利団体のセクターにおける所得の弾性解析を決定して、41年間の慈善活動と所得データーを評価する。芸術、国際性が贅沢だとみられがちであるのに対して、ほとんどの非営利セクター(宗教、教育、人間、環境) と非営利団体のサブセクターにおける全体的な提案は、通常よい評価を得ている。しかしながら、健康と公共の利益については粗悪であることを提示する。本研究には3つの貢献がある。まず供給側と需要側における証として定量的データーを提供する。第二に、研究者は、所得の弾性解析について慈善分野の影響と収入が増加した場合の仮定条件を提案する。資金提供者は、個人的な利益を得る可能性が低くなりがちである。第三に、まず全体、次に各セブセクターとして慈善活動を評価する。本研究では、各非営利団体のサブセクターが所得の変更に順応していることを示している。各非営利団体のサブセクターを個別に評価する必要がある。

Arabic

بإستخدام تحليل الإنحدار، تم تقييم 41 عام من العطاء الخيري للبيانات والدخل لتحديد إذا كان التصدق ترف، عادي أو يقل مع زيادة الدخل، ولتحديد مرونة الدخل للقطاعات الغير ربحية المستقلة. إجمالي العطاء لهذا القطاع الفرعي الغير ربحي، كذلك معظم القطاعات الغير هادفة للربح (الدين ، التعليم ، الخدمات الإنسانية، والبيئة) هو جيد عادي، في حين الفنون والعطاء الدولي هي السلع الفاخرة المحتملة. مع ذلك، تشير الدلائل إلى أن الصحة والنفع العام من المرجح أن قيمتها تقل مع الدخل. هذا البحث يميز ثلاثة مساهمات. أولا”، فإنه يقدم البيانات التي يمكن قياسها كدليل في جانب العرض والنقاش على جانب الطلب. ثانيا”، بسبب مرونة الدخل، الباحثين يقترحون منطقة المشروعات الخيرية للنفوذ وإفتراض هذا مع إرتفاع الدخل، المانحين هم أكثر عرضة لإعطاء لأسباب التي هم منها أقل إحتمال للإستفادة شخصيا”. ثالثا”، من خلال تقييم العمل الخيري ككل ومن ثم عن طريق كل قطاع فرعي، يوضح البحث أن كل قطاع فرعي غير ربحي يستجيب بشكل فريد للتغيرات في الدخل. لذلك، ينبغي تقييم القطاعات الغير ربحية على حدة.

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Correspondence to Crystal A. Evans.

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Evans, C.A., Evans, G.R. & Mayo, L. Charitable Giving as a Luxury Good and the Philanthropic Sphere of Influence. Voluntas 28, 556–570 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-016-9778-0

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Keywords

  • Nonprofit
  • Luxury good
  • Charitable giving
  • Supply-side
  • Philanthropic sphere of influence