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Negotiating the Organizational Effectiveness of Social Ventures among Multiple Stakeholders

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Abstract

When planning their social ventures, entrepreneurs generally need to consider multiple stakeholders with conflicting views of organizational effectiveness. We propose a scoring technique that is often used for the analysis of multiple-issue negotiations to analyze and manage the stakeholder conflicts. We show how the quantitative assessment of stakeholders’ preferences results in a one-dimensional subjective measure of organizational effectiveness for each stakeholder. Our approach complements recent research by contributing to a quantitative discussion of organizational effectiveness. Due to typical structural features of the employed scoring template, we are able to derive general principles concerning the conflict structure and the interaction of multiple stakeholders. We find that an increase in the number of stakeholders required for an agreement tends to decrease the perceived organizational effectiveness for the initial negotiators. On the other hand, the multitude of possible agreements is also reduced, thereby sharpening the focus on acceptable proposals to the stakeholders involved.

Résumé

Au moment de planifier leurs initiatives sociales, les entrepreneurs doivent généralement tenir compte de plusieurs intervenants ayant des opinions divergentes sur le rendement organisationnel. Pour évaluer et gérer les conflits entre lesdits intervenants, nous proposons une technique de notation souvent utilisée pour analyser les négociations à enjeux multiples. Nous démontrons comment l’évaluation quantitative de leurs préférences génère, pour chaque intervenant, une mesure subjective unidimensionnelle du rendement organisationnel. Notre approche supplémente les recherches récemment effectuées en contribuant à la discussion quantitative sur le rendement organisationnel. En fonction des caractéristiques structurelles typiques du modèle de notation employé, nous pouvons dériver des principes généraux sur la structure conflictuelle et l’interaction des divers intervenants. Nous concluons que la hausse du nombre d’intervenants requis pour en arriver à une entente tend à atténuer le rendement organisationnel perçu par les négociateurs initiaux. À l’opposé, la multitude d’ententes possibles est aussi réduite, rehaussant la concentration sur les propositions acceptables des intervenants impliqués.

Zusammenfassung

Bei der Planung von sozialen Unternehmen müssen Entrepreneure in der Regel mehrere Stakeholder mit unterschiedlichen Ansichten zur organisationalen Effektivität berücksichtigen. Um die Stakeholder-Konflikte zu analysieren und zu bewältigen, stellen wir ein Bewertungsverfahren vor, welches häufig für die Analyse von Verhandlungen über mehrere Punkte herangezogen wird. Wir zeigen, wie die quantitative Bewertung von Stakeholder-Präferenzen zu einer eindimensionalen subjektiven Messung der organisationalen Effektivität für jeden einzelnen Stakeholder führt. Unser Ansatz ergänzt neuere Forschungsansätze, indem er zu einer quantitativen Diskussion über organisationale Effektivität beiträgt. Aufgrund typischer struktureller Merkmale der angewandten Bewertungsvorlage können wir allgemeine Grundsätze hinsichtlich der Konfliktstruktur und der Interaktion mehrerer Stakeholder ableiten. Wir stellen fest, dass ein Anstieg in der Zahl der Stakeholder, die für eine Vereinbarung erforderlich sind, tendenziell dazu führt, dass die von den anfänglichen Verhandlungsführern wahrgenommene organisationale Effektivität abnimmt. Andererseits reduziert sich die Zahl der möglichen Vereinbarungen, wodurch sich die Konzentration auf für die betroffenen Stakeholder akzeptablen Vorschläge verstärkt.

Resumen

Cuando planifican sus empresas sociales, los emprendedores necesitan considerar generalmente múltiples partes interesadas con visiones conflictivas de la efectividad organizativa. Proponemos una técnica de puntuación que se utiliza a menudo para el análisis de negociaciones de múltiples cuestiones para analizar y gestionar los conflictos de las partes interesadas. Mostramos cómo la evaluación cuantitativa de las preferencias de las partes interesadas da lugar a una medida subjetiva unidimensional de la efectividad organizativa para cada parte interesada. Nuestro enfoque complementa la investigación reciente contribuyendo a un debate cuantitativo de la efectividad organizativa. Debido a las características estructurales típicas de la plantilla de puntuación empleada, podemos derivar principios generales relativos a la estructura del conflicto y a la interacción de múltiples partes interesadas. Encontramos que un aumento en el número de partes interesadas requerido para un acuerdo tiende a disminuir la efectividad organizativa percibida para los negociadores iniciales. Por otro lado, la multitud de posibles acuerdos también se reduce, ajustando de este modo el enfoque sobre propuestas aceptables para las partes interesadas implicadas.

摘要

规划社会创投时,企业家们一般需要考虑对组织效力观点有冲突的多位利益相关人。我们提供了一种评分技巧分析多问题协商,分析并管理利益相关人之间的冲突。我们指出对利益相关人喜好的定量评定如何单维主观衡量每位利益相关人的组织有效性。我们的方法量化讨论了组织有效性,对目前的研究加以补充。由于所使用评分模版的典型结构特征,我们可以得到与多位利益相关人冲突结构及相互作用有关的一般原则。我们发现增加协议所需利益相关人人数会降低最初接洽人的感知组织效力。另一方面,还会减少大量可能的协议,从而加强对有关利益相关人可接受提议的关注。

要約

社会起業を計画する際は、起業家が一般に組織有効性に相反する見解を持つ複数関係を考慮する必要がある。複数の問題交渉の分析に用いられるスコアリング手法を提示して、利害関係者の競合性を管理して分析する。利害関係者のための定量的評価がどのように利害関係者の組織の効率性における一次元的な主観評価をもたらすかを提示する。手法としては、組織の有効性における定量的な議論に貢献することによって、最近の研究を補完する。採用した得点のテンプレートにおける典型的な構造的特徴は、競合構造および複数の利害関係者との相互作用に関する一般原則に派生する。契約に必要な利害関係者の数の増加から、最初の交渉で認識された組織の有効性が低下傾向にあることが明らかになる。その一方で、可能な契約も減少しているため、利害関係者を受け入れる提案に焦点を当てる。

ملخص

عند تخطيط مشاريعهم الإجتماعية، يحتاج رجال الأعمال عموما” الأخذ في الإعتبار العديد من أصحاب المصلحة مع وجهات نظر متعارضة للفعالية التنظيمية. نقترح مهارة في حساب النقاط التي كثيرا” ما تستخدم لتحليل المفاوضات متعددة المسألة إلى تحليل وإدارة صراعات أصحاب المصلحة. نحن نظهر كيف أن نتائج التقييم الكمي لأفضليات أصحاب المصلحة في مقياس شخصي أحادي الأبعاد من الفعالية التنظيمية لكل أصحاب المصلحة. نهجنا يكمل البحوث التي أجريت مؤخرا” من خلال المساهمة في مناقشة الكمية للفعالية التنظيمية. بسبب سمات هيكلية نموذجية من قالب حساب نقاط العاملين، نحن قادرون على إستخلاص المبادئ العامة المتعلقة بنية الصراع والتفاعل بين أصحاب المصلحة المتعددين. نجد أن الزيادة في عدد أصحاب المصلحة مطلوب للتوصل الى إتفاق يميل إلى تقليل الفعالية التنظيمية للمفاوضين الأوائل. من ناحية أخرى، يتم تقليل عدد من الإتفاقيات الممكنة أيضا”، بالتالي زيادة التركيزعلى مقترحات مقبولة لدى أصحاب المصلحة المعنيين.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Compare Austin et al. (2006).

  2. 2.

    Austin et al. (2006, p. 3).

  3. 3.

    See, for example, Mort et al. (2003).

  4. 4.

    See Forbes (1998) or, for a recent discussion, see Willems et al. (2014).

  5. 5.

    See Conolly et al. (1980).

  6. 6.

    Herman and Renz (1999, p. 109).

  7. 7.

    According to the multiple-constituency approach, stakeholders assess the organizational effectiveness by evaluating the achievement of their values and objectives based on the organization’s past performance. Since, in this paper, we consider the start-up process of a social venture, there is no performance history, implying that stakeholders assess the perceived organizational effectiveness, because they form their expectations based on the organizational blueprints considered during the start-up process. For reasons of brevity only, we use the term organizational effectiveness throughout our analysis.

  8. 8.

    The term yesable proposal has been shaped by Fisher et al. (1994).

  9. 9.

    For example, Balser and McClusky (2005) or Ospina et al. (2002).

  10. 10.

    See Benjamin (2008), Balser and McClusky (2005), Ospina et al. (2002), and Herman and Renz (1999).

  11. 11.

    Underdal (2002) refers to parties’ structural and behavioral bargaining power as interacting determinants of the negotiated agreement.

  12. 12.

    More generally, in a negotiation with n criteria, a negotiated agreement consists of an n-tuple of options.

  13. 13.

    For a formal characterization of the value function see Raith (2000).

  14. 14.

    All analytical results that we obtain for the scoring procedure are formulated as principles in order to emphasize their generality, i.e., their relevance, independent of the negotiating parties and the negotiated issues.

  15. 15.

    Zammuto explains the infinite number of effectiveness models with an “infinite number of different value perspectives about the desired state of social arrangements” (p. 614). In our quantitative framework this can be achieved by allowing the options to cover ranges of specifications rather than characterizing discrete specifications, as in our example.

  16. 16.

    Some organizational blueprints imply the identical total value for each party. Hence, some agreements overlap in the north-eastern quadrant of the figure, such that only 49 distinct points are depicted.

  17. 17.

    An agreement is considered to be Pareto efficient (or: Pareto optimal), if there is no other agreement that can increase the perceived effectiveness of at least one party without decreasing the perceived effectiveness of any other party.

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Correspondence to Matthias G. Raith.

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Raith, M.G., Starke, C. Negotiating the Organizational Effectiveness of Social Ventures among Multiple Stakeholders. Voluntas 28, 1473–1499 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-016-9716-1

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Keywords

  • Business planning
  • Multiple-constituency approach
  • Negotiation
  • Organizational effectiveness
  • Social entrepreneurship