Reconsidering the Case for Enhancing Accountability Via Regulation

Original Paper

Abstract

This paper considers dangers and pitfalls associated with a range of oversight options and scenarios, including self-regulation, government regulation, donor monitoring and community participation. The paper outlines the blind spots and sources of potential bias associated with each of these oversight mechanisms. Examining the Ugandan case study we find that perceptions of corruption and ineffectiveness tarnished the reputation of the sector, but at this stage the proposed peer review mechanism and stricter government regulation are unlikely to improve NGO sector outcomes. Government regulation is anticipated to be ineffectual due to poor design and insufficient resource allocation, but both of these factors may be attributable to the underlying political motivations. Similarly, not much is expected from the peer review mechanism because participation is voluntary, offers few benefits and the list of guidelines is too long and contains too many vague and intangible quality standards. The paper argues for more empirical research to inform the design of oversight mechanisms and to monitor the impact of self-regulation and government regulation on the NGO sector. This may also help to expose and limit opportunistic interventions by government, often thinly concealed under the conceptual cloak of accountability and oversight.

Keywords

NGO Regulation Oversight Uganda 

Resume

Ce document considère des dangers et des pièges liés à une gamme des options et des scénarios d’inadvertance, y compris l’autorégulation, réglementation gouvernementale, donateur participation de surveillance et de communauté. Le papier décrit les taches aveugle et les sources de polarisation potentielle liées à chacun de ces mécanismes d’inadvertance. Examinant l’étude de cas ougandaise nous constatons que les perceptions de la corruption et de l’inefficacité ont terni la réputation du secteur, mais à ce stade le mécanisme proposé d’examen par les pairs et la réglementation gouvernementale plus stricte sont peu susceptibles d’améliorer des résultats de secteur d’O.N.G. La réglementation gouvernementale est prévue d’être due à la conception pauvre et insuffisante inefficaces l’attribution de ressource, mais tous les deux facteurs peut être attribuables aux motivations politiques fondamentales. De même, pas beaucoup est prévu du mécanisme d’examen par les pairs parce que la participation est volontaire, offre peu d’avantages et la liste de directives est trop longue et contient trop de standards de qualité vagues et intangibles. Le papier plaide pour qu’une recherche plus empirique informe la conception des mécanismes d’inadvertance et pour surveille l’impact de l’autorégulation et de la réglementation gouvernementale sur le secteur d’O.N.G. Ceci peut également aider à exposer et limiter des interventions opportunistes par le gouvernement, souvent légèrement caché sous le manteau conceptuel de la responsabilité et de l’inadvertance.

Zusammenfassung

Dieses Papier betrachtet die Gefahren und Gefahren verbunden mit einer Strecke der Aufsicht Wahlen und Drehbücher, einschließlich Selbstregulierung, Regierungsverordnung, Spender Überwachung- und Gemeinschaftsteilnahme. Das Papier umreißt die blinden Punkte und die Quellen der möglichen Vorspannung verbunden mit jedem dieser Aufsichtmechanismen. Die UgandanFallstudie überprüfend, finden wir, dass Vorstellungen von Korruption und von Wirkungslosigkeit das Renommee des Sektors trübten, aber gegenwärtig sind der vorgeschlagene Beurteilung durch eine Peer-Gruppemechanismus und die strengere Regierungsverordnung unwahrscheinlich, Organisation-Sektorresultate zu verbessern. Regierungsverordnung wird, wirkungsloses am armen Entwurf und unzulänglich zu liegen vorweggenommen Betriebsmittelzuweisung, aber beide Faktoren können den zugrunde liegenden politischen Beweggründen zuzuschreibend sein. Ähnlich wird nicht viel vom Beurteilung durch eine Peer-Gruppemechanismus, weil Teilnahme freiwillig ist, anbietet wenig Nutzen erwartet und die Liste der Richtlinien ist zu lang und enthält zu viele vagen und unberührbaren Qualitätsstandards. Das Papier argumentiert, damit empirischere Forschung den Entwurf über Aufsichtmechanismen informiert und die Auswirkung der Selbstregulierung und der Regierungsverordnung auf dem Organisation-Sektor überwacht. Dieses kann auch helfen, opportunistische Interventionen durch die Regierung herauszustellen und zu begrenzen, häufig dünn verborgen unter dem Begriffsmantel von Verantwortlichkeit und von Aufsicht.

Resumen

Este papel considera los peligros y las trampas asociados a una gama de descuido opciones y panoramas, incluyendo la autoregulación, disposición gubernamental, donante participación de la supervisión y de comunidad. El papel contornea los puntos ocultos y las fuentes de diagonal potencial asociados a cada uno de estos mecanismos de descuido. Examinando el estudio de caso del Ugandan encontramos que las opiniones de la corrupción y de la ineficacia deslustraron la reputación del sector, pero en esta etapa el mecanismo propuesto de la revisión paritaria y la disposición gubernamental más terminante son poco probables mejorar resultados del sector del NGO. Se anticipa la disposición gubernamental para ser debido al diseño pobre y escasa ineficaces la asignación de recursos, pero ambas factores puede ser atribuibles a las motivaciones políticas subyacentes. Semejantemente, no mucho se espera del mecanismo de la revisión paritaria porque la participación es voluntaria, ofrece pocas ventajas y la lista de pautas es demasiado larga y contiene demasiadas normas de calidad vagas e intangibles. El papel está a favor de una investigación más empírica para informar al diseño mecanismos de descuido y para supervisar el impacto de la autoregulación y de la disposición gubernamental en el sector del NGO. Esto puede también ayudar a exponer y a limitar intervenciones oportunistas del gobierno, encubierto a menudo fino debajo del capote conceptual de la responsabilidad y del descuido.

Japanese

このペーパーは手落ちの範囲と関連付けられたと危険および落とし穴を考慮する選択そしてシナリオ、自動調節を含んで、政府規制、提供者監視およびコミュニティ参加。 ペーパーはこれらの監督メカニズムのそれぞれと関連付けられる潜在的なバイアスの盲点そしてもとの輪郭を描く。 ウガンダのケーススタディを検査して私達は堕落および無効果の認識がセクターの評判を、この段階で提案されるメカニズムを同業者審査し、変色させたがより厳密な政府規制はNGOのセクターの結果を改善してまずないことが分る。 政府規制は拙劣な設計が効果がない原因および不十分であるために予想される資源割付け、しかし両方の要因は根本的な政治刺激に帰することができるかもしれない。 同様に参加が自発的であるので、同業者審査のメカニズムから多くが、提供する少数の利点を期待されないし、指針のリストは余りに長く、余りにも多くの不明瞭な、無形品質規格を含んでいる。 ペーパーは設計に監督メカニズムを知らせ、自動調節および政府規制の影響を監察することができるNGOのセクターの経験的な研究がように論争する。 これはまた薄く責任能力および手落ちの概念的なマントの下で隠される政府によって日和見主義の介在を、頻繁に露出し、限るのを助けるかもしれない。

Chinese

本文考虑危险和陷阱与失察相关的范围选择和情景,包括自动调整,政府规则,捐款人监视和社区参与。 本文概述潜在的偏心的盲点和来源与这些监督机制中的每一交往。 审查乌干达专题研究我们发现腐败和无效的悟性败坏了区段的名誉,但是提出的在这个状况下贵族评论机制,并且更加严密的政府规则是不太可能改进NGO区段结果。 政府规则被期望无效果归结于弱图案和不足的资源分配,但是这两个因素也许是可归咎的于部下的政治刺激。 同样,并非期望贵族评论机制,因为参与是义务的,提供少量好处,并且指南名单是太长的并且包含许多隐晦和无形的质量标准。 本文为赞成实证研究而辩论通知设计监督机制和监测自动调整和政府规则的冲击对NGO区段。 这也许也帮助由政府暴露和限制机会主义的干预,经常稀薄地被隐瞒在责任和失察之下概念性斗篷。

Arabic

وتعتبر هذه الورقة الاخطار والمزالق مرتبطة بمجموعة من الخيارات والسيناريوهات الرقابة الذاتية, ومنها تنظيم القاعدة وحكومة, بمشاركة الجهات المانحة والرصد للمجتمع. واشارت الصحيفة الى المخططات البقع العمياء ومن مصادر التحامل المحتملة المرتبطة بكل هذه الآليات الرقابية.

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Copyright information

© International Society for Third-Sector Research and The John's Hopkins University 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Stellenbosch UniversityStellenboschSouth Africa

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