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Epistemically Different Epistemic Peers

  • Mariangela Zoe CocchiaroEmail author
  • Bryan Frances
Article

Abstract

For over a decade now epistemologists have been thinking about the peer disagreement problem of whether a person is reasonable in not lowering her confidence in her belief P when she comes to accept that she has an epistemic peer on P who disbelieves P. However, epistemologists have overlooked a key realistic way how epistemic peers can, or even have to, differ epistemically—a way that reveals the inadequacy of both conformist and non-conformist views on peer disagreement by uncovering how the causes of peer disagreement bear on the debate’s core philosophical issue. Part of our argument for this thesis will involve giving a thorough yet entirely informal presentation of mathematical theorems in economics by Robert Aumann (Ann Stat 4(6):1236–1239,1976) and Polemarchakis and Geneakoplos (J Econ Theory 26:363–390,1982) which represent a formally precise description of how two rational agents must deal with disagreement under certain epistemically interesting circumstances.

Keywords

Peer disagreement Peerhood Aumann Polemarchakis & Geneakoplos Economics Agree to disagree Epistemic position Ordinary disagreements 

Notes

Funding

This study was funded by Mobilitas Pluss (Grant No. MOBTT45) and by the European Regional Development Fund (Grant No. IUT20-5).

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Hong KongHong KongHong Kong
  2. 2.University of SalzburgSalzburgAustria
  3. 3.Institute of Philosophy and SemioticsUniversity of TartuTartuEstonia

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