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Epistemically Different Epistemic Peers

  • Mariangela Zoe CocchiaroEmail author
  • Bryan Frances


For over a decade now epistemologists have been thinking about the peer disagreement problem of whether a person is reasonable in not lowering her confidence in her belief P when she comes to accept that she has an epistemic peer on P who disbelieves P. However, epistemologists have overlooked a key realistic way how epistemic peers can, or even have to, differ epistemically—a way that reveals the inadequacy of both conformist and non-conformist views on peer disagreement by uncovering how the causes of peer disagreement bear on the debate’s core philosophical issue. Part of our argument for this thesis will involve giving a thorough yet entirely informal presentation of mathematical theorems in economics by Robert Aumann (Ann Stat 4(6):1236–1239,1976) and Polemarchakis and Geneakoplos (J Econ Theory 26:363–390,1982) which represent a formally precise description of how two rational agents must deal with disagreement under certain epistemically interesting circumstances.


Peer disagreement Peerhood Aumann Polemarchakis & Geneakoplos Economics Agree to disagree Epistemic position Ordinary disagreements 



This study was funded by Mobilitas Pluss (Grant No. MOBTT45) and by the European Regional Development Fund (Grant No. IUT20-5).


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© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Hong KongHong KongHong Kong
  2. 2.University of SalzburgSalzburgAustria
  3. 3.Institute of Philosophy and SemioticsUniversity of TartuTartuEstonia

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