Peer Disagreement and the Bridge Principle
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One explanation of rational peer disagreement is that agents find themselves in an epistemically permissive situation. In fact, some authors have suggested that, while evidence could be impermissive at the intrapersonal level, it is permissive at the interpersonal level. In this paper, I challenge such a claim. I will argue that, at least in cases of rational disagreement under full disclosure (i.e., the cases in which epistemic peers are fully aware of each other’s evidence and arguments), there cannot be more interpersonal epistemically permissive situations than there are intrapersonal epistemically permissive situations. In other words, with respect to cases of disagreement under full disclosure, I will argue that there is a necessary connection (or a “bridge”) between interpersonal permissiveness and its intrapersonal counterpart. Specifically, I claim that a plausible principle of correct argumentation supports such a bridge.
KeywordsEpistemic rationality Uniqueness Argumentation Epistemic peer Evidence
Thanks to Charles Côté-Bouchard, Samuel Dishaw, Ulf Hlobil, Daniel Laurier, Samuel Montplaisir, Andrew Reisner, Olle Risberg, Xander Selene, Folke Tersman and three anonymous referees for helpful comments on this project. I warmly thank David Godden and Patrick Bondy, the editors of this special issue, for their useful comments and suggestions. This research was financed by the Groupe de Recherche Interuniversitaire sur la Normativité (GRIN) and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.
This study was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (Grant #767-2016-1771).
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of interest
Marc-Kevin Daoust declares that he has no conflict of interest.
This article does not contain any studies with human participants performed by any of the authors.
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