Advertisement

Topoi

pp 1–11 | Cite as

Peer Disagreement and the Bridge Principle

  • Marc-Kevin Daoust
Article
  • 38 Downloads

Abstract

One explanation of rational peer disagreement is that agents find themselves in an epistemically permissive situation. In fact, some authors have suggested that, while evidence could be impermissive at the intrapersonal level, it is permissive at the interpersonal level. In this paper, I challenge such a claim. I will argue that, at least in cases of rational disagreement under full disclosure (i.e., the cases in which epistemic peers are fully aware of each other’s evidence and arguments), there cannot be more interpersonal epistemically permissive situations than there are intrapersonal epistemically permissive situations. In other words, with respect to cases of disagreement under full disclosure, I will argue that there is a necessary connection (or a “bridge”) between interpersonal permissiveness and its intrapersonal counterpart. Specifically, I claim that a plausible principle of correct argumentation supports such a bridge.

Keywords

Epistemic rationality Uniqueness Argumentation Epistemic peer Evidence 

Notes

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Charles Côté-Bouchard, Samuel Dishaw, Ulf Hlobil, Daniel Laurier, Samuel Montplaisir, Andrew Reisner, Olle Risberg, Xander Selene, Folke Tersman and three anonymous referees for helpful comments on this project. I warmly thank David Godden and Patrick Bondy, the editors of this special issue, for their useful comments and suggestions. This research was financed by the Groupe de Recherche Interuniversitaire sur la Normativité (GRIN) and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.

Funding

This study was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (Grant #767-2016-1771).

Compliance with Ethical Standards

Conflict of interest

Marc-Kevin Daoust declares that he has no conflict of interest.

Ethical Approval

This article does not contain any studies with human participants performed by any of the authors.

References

  1. Aberdein A (2016) The vices of argument. Topoi 35:413–422CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Brueckner A, Bundy A (2012) On “epistemic permissiveness”. Synthese 188:165–177CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Christensen D (1994) Conservatism in epistemology. Noûs 28:69–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Christensen D (2000) Diachronic coherence versus epistemic impartiality. Philos Rev 109:349–371.  https://doi.org/10.2307/2693694 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Christensen D (2009) Disagreement as evidence: the epistemology of controversy. Philos Compass 4:756–767CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Christensen D (2013) Epistemic modesty defended. In: Christensen D, Lackey J (eds) The epistemology of disagreement: new essays. Oxford University Press, OxfordCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Christensen D (2014) Conciliation, uniqueness and rational toxicity. Noûs.  https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12077 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Cohen DH (2005) Arguments that backfire. In: Hitchcock D, Farr D (eds) The uses of argument. OSSA, Hamilton, pp 58–65Google Scholar
  9. Cohen S (2013) A defense of the (almost) equal weight view. In: Lackey J, Christensen D (eds) The epistemology of disagreement: new essays. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 98–120CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Cohen DH, Miller G (2016) What virtue argumentation theory misses: the case of compathetic argumentation. Topoi 35:451–460CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Daoust M-K (2018) One standard to rule them all? Ratio.  https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12201 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Dare T, Kingsbury J (2008) Putting the burden of proof in its place: When are differential allocations legitimate? South J Philos 46:503–518CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Dogramaci S, Horowitz S (2016) An argument for uniqueness about evidential support. Philos Issues 26:130–147CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Douven I (2009) Uniqueness revisited. Am Philos Q 46:347–361Google Scholar
  15. Drake J (2016) Doxastic permissiveness and the promise of truth. Synthese.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1176-z CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Elga A (2010) How to disagree about how to disagree. In: Warfield T, Feldman R (eds) Disagreement. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  17. Fogelin R (1985) The logic of deep disagreements. Informal Logic 7:1–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Godden D (2008) On common knowledge and ad populum: acceptance as grounds for acceptability. Philos Rhetor 41:101–129CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Godden D (2016) On the priority of agent-based argumentative norms. Topoi 35:345–357CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Goldman A (1986) Epistemology and cognition. Harvard University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  21. Gordon TF, Prakken H, Walton D (2007) The Carneades model of argument and burden of proof. Artif Intell 171:875–896CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Greco D, Hedden B (2016) Uniqueness and metaepistemology. J Philos 113:365–395.  https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2016113825 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Hahn U, Oaksford M (2007) The burden of proof and its role in argumentation. Argumentation 21:39–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Hedden B (2015) A defense of objectivism about evidential support. Can J Philos 45:716–743CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Horowitz S (2014) Immoderately rational. Philos Stud 167:41–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Kelly T (2010) Peer disagreement and higher-order evidence. In: Warfield T, Feldman R (eds) Disagreement. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 111–172CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Kelly T (2014) Evidence can be permissive. In: Steup M, Turri J, Sosa E (eds) Contemporary debates in epistemology. Wiley, HobokenGoogle Scholar
  28. Kidd IJ (2016) Intellectual humility, confidence, and argumentation. Topoi 35:395–402CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. King NL (2012) Disagreement: what’s the problem? Or a good peer is hard to find. Res 85:249–272Google Scholar
  30. Kopec M (2015) A counterexample to the uniqueness thesis. Philosophia 43:403–409CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. Kopec M, Titelbaum MG (2016) The uniqueness thesis. Philos Compass 11:189–200CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Kwong JM (2016) Open-mindedness as a critical virtue. Topoi 35:403–411CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Lewis D (1971) Immodest inductive methods. Philos Sci 38:54–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Matheson J (2011) The case for rational uniqueness. Logos Episteme 2:359–373CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Mayo-Wilson C, Wheeler G (2016) Scoring imprecise credences: a mildly immodest proposal. Philos Phenomenol Res 93:55–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Meacham CJ (2014) Impermissive bayesianism. Erkenntnis 79:1185–1217CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Pettigrew R (2016) Accuracy, risk, and the principle of indifference. Philos Phenomenol Res 92:35–59.  https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12097 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. Podgorski A (2016a) Dynamic permissivism. Philos Stud 173:1923–1939CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  39. Podgorski A (2016b) Dynamic conservatism. Ergo, an open access. J Philos.  https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0003.013 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  40. Raleigh T (2015) An argument for permissivism from safespots. In: Hoek W van der, Holliday WH, Wang W (eds) Logic, rationality, and interaction. Springer, Berlin, pp 308–315CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  41. Schoenfield M (2014) Permission to believe: why permissivism is true and what it tells us about irrelevant influences on belief. Noûs 48:193–218CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  42. Sharadin N (2015) A partial defense of permissivism. Ratio.  https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12115 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  43. Simpson RM (2017) Permissivism and the arbitrariness objection. Episteme 14:519–538CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  44. Titelbaum MG (2013) Quitting certainties: a Bayesian framework modeling degrees of belief. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  45. Titelbaum MG (2015a) Continuing on. Can J Philos 45:670–691CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  46. Titelbaum MG (2015b) Rationality’s fixed point (or: in defense of right reason). Oxford Stud Epistemol 5:253–294CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  47. Titelbaum MG (2017) One’s own reasoning. Inquiry 60:208–232CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  48. Titelbaum MG, Kopec M (m.s.) Plausible permissivism. Unpublished manuscriptGoogle Scholar
  49. Titelbaum MG, Kopec M (forthcoming) When rational reasoners reason differently. In: Balcerak Jackson M, Balcerak Jackson B (eds) Reasoning: essays on theoretical and practical thinking. Oxford University Press, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  50. Van Eemeren FH, Houtlosser P (2015) Strategic maneuvering with the burden of proof. In: Reasonableness and effectiveness in argumentative discourse. Springer, Cham, pp 425–442CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  51. Walton D (1988) Burden of proof. Argumentation 2:233–254Google Scholar
  52. Walton D (2009) Argumentation theory: a very short introduction. In: Simari G, Rahwan I (eds) Argumentation in artificial intelligence. Springer, Boston, pp 1–22Google Scholar
  53. Walton D (2014) Burden of proof, presumption and argumentation. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  54. Warfield T, Feldman R (eds) (2010) Disagreement. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  55. White R (2005) Epistemic permissiveness. Philos Perspect 19:445–459CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  56. White R (2014) Evidence cannot be permissive. In: Steup M, Turri J, Sosa E (eds) Contemporary debates in epistemology. Wiley, Hoboken, pp 312–323Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Université de MontréalMontréalCanada
  2. 2.MontréalCanada

Personalised recommendations