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Topoi

, Volume 35, Issue 2, pp 441–450 | Cite as

Virtue and Arguers

  • José Ángel Gascón
Article

Abstract

Is a virtue approach in argumentation possible without committing the ad hominem fallacy? My answer is affirmative, provided that the object study of our theory is well delimited. My proposal is that a theory of argumentative virtue should not focus on argument appraisal, as has been assumed, but on those traits that make an individual achieve excellence in argumentative practices. An agent-based approach in argumentation should be developed, not in order to find better grounds for argument appraisal, but to gain insight into argumentative habits and excellence. This way we can benefit from what a virtue argumentation theory really has to offer.

Keywords

Arguers Argumentation Ad hominem Virtue 

Notes

Acknowledgments

The first draft of this paper benefited from discussions with Javier González de Prado, Susana Monsó, Alejandro Díaz, Marco Antonio Joven Romero and Paula Olmos. I also presented it at the 8th ISSA Conference on Argumentation in Amsterdam, where I received valuable comments. I am especially grateful to Luis Vega and Cristina Corredor, who commented on subsequent versions of the paper, as well as to two anonymous reviewers that contributed greatly to sharpen my ideas. Finally, I must thank Daniel Slee for revising my English. This research was funded by a scholarship from the UNED.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED)MadridSpain

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