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Topoi

, Volume 35, Issue 2, pp 375–383 | Cite as

The Virtuous Arguer: One Person, Four Roles

  • Katharina Stevens
Article

Abstract

When evaluating the arguer instead of the argument, we soon find ourselves confronted with a puzzling situation: what seems to be a virtue in one argumentative situation could very well be called a vice in another. This paper will present the idea that there are in fact two sets of virtues an arguer has to master—and with them four sometimes very different roles.

Keywords

Adversarial ideal Cooperative ideal Practical wisdom Virtue 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.McMaster UniversityHamiltonCanada

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