Topoi

, Volume 34, Issue 1, pp 201–216

Temporal Experience: Models, Methodology and Empirical Evidence

Article

Abstract

This paper has two aims. First, to bring together the models of temporal phenomenology on offer and to present these using a consistent set of distinctions and terminologies. Second, to examine the methodologies currently practiced in the development of these models. To that end we present an abstract characterisation in which we catalogue all extant models. We then argue that neither of the two extreme methodologies currently discussed is suitable to the task of developing a model of temporal phenomenology. An entirely top-down methodology is largely insensitive to empirical findings, while one that is entirely bottom-up is insensitive to both introspective evidence and more general philosophical considerations. We recommend a methodology that falls between these two extremes.

Keywords

Time Experience of time Methodology Psychology 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Unit for the History and Philosophy of Science and The Centre for TimeThe University of SydneySydneyAustralia
  2. 2.School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry and The Centre for TimeThe University of SydneySydneyAustralia

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