, Volume 31, Issue 1, pp 9–16

Truth as an Epistemic Notion


DOI: 10.1007/s11245-011-9107-6

Cite this article as:
Prawitz, D. Topoi (2012) 31: 9. doi:10.1007/s11245-011-9107-6


What is the appropriate notion of truth for sentences whose meanings are understood in epistemic terms such as proof or ground for an assertion? It seems that the truth of such sentences has to be identified with the existence of proofs or grounds, and the main issue is whether this existence is to be understood in a temporal sense as meaning that we have actually found a proof or a ground, or if it could be taken in an abstract, tenseless sense. Would the latter alternative amount to realism with respect to proofs or grounds in a way that would be contrary to the supposedly anti-realistic standpoint underlying the epistemic understanding of linguistic expressions? Before discussing this question, I shall consider reasons for construing linguistic meaning epistemically and relations between such reasons and reasons for taking an anti-realist point of view towards the discourse in question.


Truth Intuitionism Anti-realism Meaning-theory 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyStockholm UniversityStockholmSweden

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