Topoi

, Volume 31, Issue 1, pp 17–26

Manifestability and Epistemic Truth

Article
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Abstract

I argue that the standard anti-realist argument from manifestability to intuitionistic logic is either unsound or invalid. Strong interpretations of the manifestability of understanding are falsified by the existence of blindspots for knowledge. Weaker interpretations are either too weak, or gerrymandered and ad hoc. Either way, they present no threat to classical logic.

Keywords

Manifestability Semantic anti-realism Basic Revisionary Argument Paradox of Knowability 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Munich Center for Mathematical PhilosophyLudwig-Maximilians UniversitätMunichGermany

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