, Volume 28, Issue 1, pp 23–30 | Cite as

Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories

  • Evan ThompsonEmail author
  • Mog Stapleton


This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making. We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.


Enaction Extended mind Autonomy Sense-making Emotion Embodiment Incorporation 



The work of the second author was supported by the AHRC (Grant Number ESF/AH/E511139/1) and forms a part of the CONTACT (Consciousness in Interaction) Project. The CONTACT project is a part of the ESF EuroCORES Consciousness in the Natural and Cultural Context scheme.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of TorontoTorontoCanada
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of EdinburghEdinburghScotland, UK

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