, Volume 28, Issue 1, pp 23–30

Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories


DOI: 10.1007/s11245-008-9043-2

Cite this article as:
Thompson, E. & Stapleton, M. Topoi (2009) 28: 23. doi:10.1007/s11245-008-9043-2


This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making. We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.


Enaction Extended mind Autonomy Sense-making Emotion Embodiment Incorporation 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of TorontoTorontoCanada
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of EdinburghEdinburghScotland, UK

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