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Theory and Decision

, Volume 85, Issue 2, pp 179–200 | Cite as

The joy of ruling: an experimental investigation on collective giving

  • Enrique Fatas
  • Antonio J. Morales
Article
  • 207 Downloads

Abstract

We analyse team dictator games with different voting mechanisms in the laboratory. Individuals vote to select a donation for all group members. Standard Bayesian analysis makes the same prediction for all three mechanisms: participants should cast the same vote regardless of the voting mechanism used to determine the common donation level. Our experimental results show that subjects fail to choose the same vote. We show that their behaviour is consistent with a joy of ruling: individuals get an extra utility when they determine the voting outcome.

Keywords

Public goods Voting Joy of winning Altruism Warm-glow Responsibility Experiments 

Supplementary material

11238_2017_9646_MOESM1_ESM.pdf (111 kb)
Supplementary material 1 (pdf 111 KB)

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of East AngliaNorwichUK
  2. 2.Departamento de Teoría Económica, Facultad de Ciencias EconómicasUniversidad de MalagaMálagaSpain

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