Abstract
We introduce a TU-game that describes a market where information is distributed among several agents and all these pieces of information are necessary to produce a good. This situation will be called clan information market. The class of the corresponding TU-games, the clan information market games (CIGs), is a subset of the class of clan games. We provide some well-known point solutions for CIGs in terms of the market data.
Keywords
Information market Clan Core Shapley value \(\tau \)-value PMASNotes
Acknowledgements
The authors acknowledge the helpful suggestions of Marina Núñez and the two anonymous referees. The second author also acknowledges the support from the research Grants ECO2014-52340-P (Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad) and 2014 SGR 40 (Generalitat de Catalunya).
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