Theory and Decision

, Volume 82, Issue 1, pp 31–39 | Cite as

Resolute majority rules



We investigate resolute voting rules that always rank two alternatives strictly and avoid social indecision. Resolute majority rules differ from the standard majority rule in that whenever both alternatives win the same number of votes, a tie-breaking function is used to determine the outcome. We provide axiomatic characterizations of resolute majority rules or resolute majority rules with a quorum. Resoluteness axiom is used in all these results. The other axioms are weaker than those considered in the characterization of the majority rule by May (1952 Econometrica, 20:680–684). In particular, instead of May’s positive responsiveness, we consider a much weaker monotonicity axiom.


Majority rule Majority rule with a quorum Resoluteness Neutrality Monotonicity Positive responsiveness 

JEL Classification



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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsSeoul National UniversitySeoulSouth Korea
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsWashington University in St. LouisSt. LouisUSA

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