In textbook models of reputation, a number of entry games are played sequentially. A multimarket incumbent—the chain store—deters entry of “early” small entrants with a threat of predation. In the last markets of the game, entry occurs stochastically. We show that this stochastic entry is due to a restrictive assumption and vanishes if entrants that initially decided to stay out are allowed to reconsider their decision following entry elsewhere.
Multimarket Firms Entry Predation Reputation
C72 C73 D82 L1 L41
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