Theory and Decision

, Volume 81, Issue 1, pp 33–52 | Cite as

Veto players and equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron–Ferejohn model

  • Levent Celik
  • Bilgehan KarabayEmail author


In political economy, the seminal contribution of the Baron–Ferejohn bargaining model constitutes an important milestone for the study of legislative policy making. In this paper, we analyze a particular equilibrium characteristic of this model, equilibrium uniqueness. The Baron–Ferejohn model yields a class of payoff-unique stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) in which players’ equilibrium strategies are not uniquely determined. We first provide a formal proof of the multiplicity of equilibrium strategies. This also enables us to establish some important properties of SSPE. We then introduce veto players into the original Baron–Ferejohn model. We state the conditions under which the new model has a unique SSPE not only in terms of payoffs but also in terms of players’ equilibrium strategies.


Multilateral bargaining Equilibrium uniqueness Veto players 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.National Research University Higher School of EconomicsMoscowRussia
  2. 2.CERGE-EI (A Joint Workplace of Charles University and the Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic)PragueCzech Republic
  3. 3.School of Economics, Finance and MarketingRMIT UniversityMelbourneAustralia

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