Theory and Decision

, Volume 78, Issue 2, pp 273–287 | Cite as

A proportional value for cooperative games with a coalition structure

  • Frank Huettner


We introduce a solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utility and a coalition structure that is proportional for two-player games. Our value is obtained from generalizing a proportional value for cooperative games with transferable utility (Ortmann 2000) in a way that parallels the extension of the Shapley value to the Owen value. We provide two characterizations of our solution concept, one that employs a property that can be seen as the proportional analog to Myerson’s balanced contribution property; and a second one that relies on a consistency property.


Shapley value Owen value Proportional value Consistency 



I would like to thank Sylvain Béal, André Casajus, Philippe Solal, Winfried Hochstättler, Harald Wiese, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on previous versions of this paper. Financial support from the Université Charles-de-Gaulle—Lille 3 is gratefully acknowledged.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Université de Franche-Comté, CRESE (EA 3190)BesanconFrance
  2. 2.LSI Leipziger Spieltheoretisches InstitutLeipzigGermany
  3. 3.HHL Leipzig Graduate School of ManagementLeipzigGermany

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