Theory and Decision

, Volume 78, Issue 1, pp 117–139 | Cite as

An axiomatization of Choquet expected utility with cominimum independence

  • Takao Asano
  • Hiroyuki Kojima


This paper proposes a class of independence axioms for simple acts. By introducing the \({\mathcal {E}}\)-cominimum independence axiom that is stronger than the comonotonic independence axiom but weaker than the independence axiom, we provide a new axiomatization theorem of simple acts within the framework of Choquet expected utility. Furthermore, in order to provide the axiomatization of simple acts, we generalize Kajii et al. (J Math Econ 43:218–230, 2007) into an infinite state space. Our axiomatization theorem relates Choquet expected utility to multi-prior expected utility through the core of a capacity that is explicitly derived within our framework. Our result in this paper also derives Gilboa (Econometrica 57:1153–1169, 1989), Eichberger and Kelsey (Theory Decis 46:107–140, 1999), and Rohde (Soc Choice Welf 34:537–547, 2010) as a corollary.


Cominimum additivity Cominimum independence Choquet expected utility Multi-prior expected utility Core  E-capacity expected utility 



We would like to appreciate an anonymous referee for his or her comments and suggestions that have improved this paper substantially. We are grateful to Takashi Ui for his comments and advice on this work. This research was financially supported by the JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers 25380239, 23730299, 23000001 and 22530186, and the Joint Research Program of KIER. Of course, we are responsible for any remaining errors.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of EconomicsOkayama UniversityOkayamaJapan
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsTeikyo UniversityHachiojiJapan

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