Theory and Decision

, Volume 78, Issue 1, pp 33–44 | Cite as

A note on equivalent comparisons of information channels

  • Luís Fernando Brands Barbosa
  • Gil RiellaEmail author


Nakata (Theory Decis 71:559–574, 2011) presents a model of acquisition of information where the agent does not know what pieces of information she is missing. In this note, we point out some technical problems in a few of Nakata’s results and show how to correct them.


Information channels Preferences over menus Weak expected utility representation Ordinal expected utility representation Additive expected utility representation 



We thank José Heleno Faro, Rogerio Mazali, Hiroyuki Nakata, Leandro Nascimento and José Guilherme de Lara Resende for helpful discussions and suggestions.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversidade de BrasíliaBrasíliaBrazil

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