Theory and Decision

, Volume 77, Issue 1, pp 111–124 | Cite as

The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections



In referendum elections, voters are often required to register simultaneous votes on multiple proposals. The separability problem occurs when a voter’s preferred outcome on one proposal depends on the outcomes of other proposals. This type of interdependence can lead to unsatisfactory or even paradoxical election outcomes, such as a winning outcome that is the last choice of every voter. Here we propose an iterative voting scheme that allows voters to revise their voting strategies based on the outcomes of previous iterations. Using a robust computer simulation, we investigate the potential of this approach to solve the separability problem.


Referendum elections Separability Iterative voting  Computer simulation Game theory Learning 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Division of Applied MathematicsBrown UniversityProvidenceUSA
  2. 2.Department of MathematicsGrand Valley State UniversityAllendaleUSA
  3. 3.Marian University College of Osteopathic MedicineIndianapolisUSA

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