An axiomatization of the kernel for TU games through reduced game monotonicity and reduced dominance
- 180 Downloads
In the framework of transferable utility games, we modify the 2-person Davis–Maschler reduced game to ensure non-emptiness (NE) of the imputation set of the adapted 2-person reduced game. Based on the modification, we propose two new axioms: reduced game monotonicity (RGM) and reduced dominance (RD). Using RGM, RD, NE, Covariance under strategic equivalence, Equal treatment property and Pareto optimality, we are able to characterize the kernel.
KeywordsCooperative game Kernel Reduced game Monotonicity Dominance
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Maschler, M. (1992). The bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus. In R. J. Aumann & S. Hart (Eds.), Handbook of game theory with economic applications (Vol. I, pp. 591–667). Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.Google Scholar
- Shapley L. S. (1953) A value for n-person games. In: Tucker A. W., Luce R. D. (Eds.) ,Contributions to the theory of games II. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, pp 307–317Google Scholar
- von Neumann J., Morgenstern O. (1944) Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJGoogle Scholar