Theory and Decision

, Volume 74, Issue 1, pp 1–12 | Cite as

An axiomatization of the kernel for TU games through reduced game monotonicity and reduced dominance

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Abstract

In the framework of transferable utility games, we modify the 2-person Davis–Maschler reduced game to ensure non-emptiness (NE) of the imputation set of the adapted 2-person reduced game. Based on the modification, we propose two new axioms: reduced game monotonicity (RGM) and reduced dominance (RD). Using RGM, RD, NE, Covariance under strategic equivalence, Equal treatment property and Pareto optimality, we are able to characterize the kernel.

Keywords

Cooperative game Kernel Reduced game Monotonicity Dominance 

JEL Classification

C71 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Applied Mathematics, Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer ScienceUniversity of TwenteEnschedeThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsNational Cheng Kung UniversityTainanTaiwan

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