Theory and Decision

, Volume 74, Issue 4, pp 479–507

Communication compatible voting rules

Article

Abstract

We reassess the possibility of full information pooling in a Condorcet jury environment featuring heterogeneous and privately known preference types. We find that in general, with uncorrelated preference types, only very limited heterogeneity is compatible with full pooling. We provide a sufficient condition, based on a simple measure of preference misalignment, under which the set of voting rules compatible with full pooling is at most a singleton. As a caveat to any simplistic conclusions, we identify a case in which an increase in heterogeneity (i.e. polarization) systematically generates the possibility of full pooling. Increased jury size, in contrast, is shown to always render full pooling more difficult.

Keywords

Committees Communication Strategic voting 

JEL Classification

C72 D71 D72 D74 D82 D83 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of BonnBonnGermany

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