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We show that if an agent reasons according to standard inference rules, the truth and introspection axioms extend from the set of non-epistemic propositions to the whole set of propositions. This implies that the usual axiomatization of partitional possibility correspondences is redundant, and provides a justification for truth and introspection that is partly based on reasoning.
KeywordsKnowledge Introspection Truth axiom Partitional information structures Epistemic game theory
JEL ClassificationD80 D83 D89
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