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Theory and Decision

, Volume 74, Issue 2, pp 167–182 | Cite as

The predictive role of counterfactuals

  • Alfredo Di Tillio
  • Itzhak Gilboa
  • Larry Samuelson
Article

Abstract

We suggest a model that describes how counterfactuals are constructed and justified. The model can describe how counterfactual beliefs are updated given the unfolding of actual history. It also allows us to examine the use of counterfactuals in prediction, and to show that a logically omniscient reasoner gains nothing from using counterfactuals for prediction.

Keywords

Induction Counterfactuals Prediction 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alfredo Di Tillio
    • 1
  • Itzhak Gilboa
    • 2
    • 3
  • Larry Samuelson
    • 4
  1. 1.Università BocconiMilanItaly
  2. 2.Tel-Aviv UniversityTel AvivIsrael
  3. 3.HEC ParisJouy-en-JosasFrance
  4. 4.Yale UniversityNew HavenUSA

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