Theory and Decision

, Volume 69, Issue 3, pp 489–496 | Cite as

Sleeping Beauty and the absent-minded driver

  • Jean BaratginEmail author
  • Bernard Walliser


The Sleeping Beauty problem is presented in a formalized framework which summarizes the underlying probability structure. The two rival solutions proposed by Elga (Analysis 60:143–147, 2000) and Lewis (Analysis 61:171–176, 2001) differ by a single parameter concerning her prior probability. They can be supported by considering, respectively, that Sleeping Beauty is “fuzzy-minded” and “blank-minded”, the first interpretation being more natural than the second. The traditional absent-minded driver problem is reinterpreted in this framework and sustains Elga’s solution.


Absent-mindedness Belief revision Probability Sleeping Beauty problem 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Paragraphe (CRAC), Institut Jean NicodUniversité Paris 8Saint-Denis cedexFrance
  2. 2.Paris School of EconomicsENPC-EHESSParisFrance

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