Theory and Decision

, Volume 70, Issue 1, pp 45–64 | Cite as

Individual and couple decision behavior under risk: evidence on the dynamics of power balance

  • André de Palma
  • Nathalie Picard
  • Anthony Ziegelmeyer
Open Access
Article

Abstract

This article reports results of an experiment designed to analyze the link between risky decisions made by couples and risky decisions made separately by each spouse. We estimate both the spouses and the couples’ degrees of risk aversion, we assess how the risk preferences of the two spouses aggregate when they make risky decisions, and we shed light on the dynamics of the decision process that takes place when couples make risky decisions. We find that, far from being fixed, the balance of power within the household is malleable. In most couples, men have, initially, more decision-making power than women but women who ultimately implement the joint decisions gain more and more power over the course of decision making.

Keywords

Balance of power Experiments Household decision-making Risk 

Supplementary material

11238_2009_9179_MOESM1_ESM.pdf (180 kb)
ESM 1 (PDF 180 kb)

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • André de Palma
    • 1
    • 2
    • 3
  • Nathalie Picard
    • 3
    • 4
    • 5
  • Anthony Ziegelmeyer
    • 6
    • 7
  1. 1.Ecole Normale Supérieure de CachanCachanFrance
  2. 2.Institut Universitaire de FranceParisFrance
  3. 3.Ecole PolytechniquePalaiseauFrance
  4. 4.THEMAUniversity of Cergy-PontoiseCergy-Pontoise CedexFrance
  5. 5.INEDParisFrance
  6. 6.Strategic Interaction GroupMax Planck Institute of EconomicsJenaGermany
  7. 7.Faculty of Economics and ManagementTechnical University of BerlinBerlinGermany

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